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 Justice Bertha Wilson and 
the Politics of Feminism 
Constance Backhouse* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Madam Justice Bertha Wilson’s biographer, Ellen Anderson, was 
adamant that the first woman appointed to the Canadian Supreme Court 
was not a feminist. Anderson makes the point in her book, Judging 
Bertha Wilson: Law as Large as Life, on the second page of the preface, 
and no fewer than three additional times in the book, noting that Justice 
Wilson “declines to identify herself as a feminist”, does “not consider 
herself a feminist”, was “avowedly not a feminist”, and finally that she 
“most emphatically does not consider herself a feminist”.1 Interestingly, 
none of these statements is a direct quote from Justice Wilson. Anderson 
herself is no fan of feminists — whom she describes as “confrontational” 
and “fervent” — or indeed of feminism, which she characterizes as given 
to “simple-minded dichotomies”, “self-righteous certainty” and 
“feminist rant”.2 In a previous publication, I expressed some concern 
over whether Anderson’s own anti-feminism impeded her ability to 
undertake an accurate assessment of Justice Wilson’s relationship with 
feminism.3 It is no longer possible to question Justice Wilson directly 
regarding her position on feminism. However, I have since had an 
opportunity to speak with Madam Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, who 
served on the bench for many years with Justice Wilson, after she 
became the second woman appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
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Justice L’Heureux-Dubé confirmed that Justice Wilson never self-
identified as a feminist.4  
The politics of feminism and the self-referential label “feminist” 
have long had an uneasy relationship with women in law. I want to use 
this forum to begin to reflect upon why individuals such as Justice 
Wilson, whose legal and judicial careers stand as such beacons for social 
justice advocates, were so reluctant to refer to themselves as feminists. I 
also want to question whether Justice Wilson’s apparent choice not to 
identify with feminism means that we are estopped from describing her 
as a “feminist judge”. I come to this discussion as a self-identified 
feminist of many decades, who has been involved as a writer, teacher 
and activist with the Canadian feminist movement. While I understand 
that feminists are undoubtedly capable of all the things Anderson 
accuses us of, the feminism that I and many others aspire to bears little 
resemblance to Anderson’s depiction of it. And I remain curious about 
Justice Wilson’s apparent uneasiness over the term “feminist”. 
II. THE WIDER CONTEXT OF FEMINISM AND LAW 
Mary Jane Mossman has noted that the early women lawyers in 
Canada were reluctant to call attention to their gender, and insistent on 
being treated as lawyers, rather than women lawyers.5 My preliminary 
research into the lives and careers of some of Ontario’s early women 
lawyers accords with this conclusion.6 Although many experienced 
discriminatory treatment from employers, colleagues, clients and judges, 
few were prepared to label the behaviour as “sexist”. In informal and 
confidential settings, they would recount innumerable incidents where 
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 Interview with Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, Ottawa, November 1, 2007. 
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 Mary Jane Mossman, The First Women Lawyers: A Comparative Study of Gender, Law 
and the Legal Profession (Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 2006) [hereinafter “The First 
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6
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and Prejudice: Women and Law in Nineteenth-Century Canada (Toronto: Women’s Press, 1991), at 
chapter 10.  
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they had been refused jobs, treated differentially and dismissively by 
senior lawyers, colleagues and professional organizations, rejected by 
potential clients, and treated as curiosities by judges. Then they would 
insist that they had never experienced discrimination based on gender. In 
public, they preferred to speak of the men who had offered kindness and 
support, and to insist that women could succeed in law as well as men.  
It is my sense that the first cohort of women decided that it was 
strategically wiser to ignore or discount the negative treatment, because 
to dwell on the difficulties would have left them too angry, bitter and 
depressed to continue their careers. Framing their experiences through 
consciously positive and optimistic philosophies, they chose instead to 
focus on instances of affirmative assistance. Perhaps they hoped that by 
giving public recognition to such acts and the generous individuals who 
were responsible for them, they could inspire others to emulate 
egalitarian behaviour. They chose to eschew any detailed analysis of 
sexism in law, and to put their energies toward the difficult job of simply 
trying to establish a foothold in a male-dominated profession.  
Nevertheless, it is equally clear that the early women lawyers 
generally espoused a strongly pro-woman perspective. I have come 
across none who suggested that women should be subordinate to men, 
and none who expressed skepticism about the capacity of women 
lawyers to succeed in the profession. To the contrary, these lawyers 
seemed committed to heralding and celebrating the full integration of 
women in law, although they wished to do so without publicly calling 
attention to gender.  
There was a noticeable shift after 1970, when a vibrant cohort of 
young women came through law school while “second-wave” feminism 
was growing and flourishing in the wider Canadian society.7 Prior to 
1970, the percentage of women in law had hovered around 5 per cent. In 
1970, the number jumped to 12.7 per cent, and by 1985, it had reached 
45.7 per cent, in what has been described as “a revolution in numbers”.8 
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 For an introduction into the literature regarding the genesis and nature of both first and 
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 The phrase “revolution in numbers” is a quote from Rosalie Abella, as noted in The First 
Women Lawyers, supra, note 5, at 10. In 1945, 4.4 per cent of the law students in Canada were 
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This numerically unprecedented cohort publicly drew attention to the 
multiple gender inequalities facing women in law, and collectively 
demanded wide-ranging changes. Not all of the younger women would 
have labelled themselves feminists. But the new era brought a certain 
“safety in numbers” and many of the women who became lawyers after 
1970 recognized that they had the luxury of identifying with feminism 
because they were able to offer each other protection and support.9 The 
wider explosion of feminist activism that manifested itself simultaneously 
in electoral politics, education, the media, the family, health and welfare, 
the labour market, sports, and the arts, also made it possible for women 
lawyers to bring a fresh perspective to their profession.10  
Not surprisingly, some tensions arose between the new self-
identified feminist cohort and the more senior women lawyers who had 
preceded them. The younger feminist cohort was insistent that gender 
mattered. As students, they took collective action within law schools as 
they demanded an end to unequal treatment, and launched public 
demonstrations over sexism in the bar admission course. They called 
attention to sexual harassment within the profession. They organized 
lobby campaigns to force governments to repeal sexist laws, and 
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Bar, unpublished manuscript. 
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Movement in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1988); Peta Tancred-Sheriff, ed., Feminist 
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Burt, Lorraine Code & Lindsay Dorney, eds., Changing Patterns: Women in Canada (Toronto: 
McClelland and Stewart, 1988); Constance Backhouse & David H. Flaherty, Challenging Times: 
The Women’s Movement in Canada and the United States (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 1992); Linda Carty, ed., And Still We Rise: Feminist Political Mobilizing in Contemporary 
Canada (Toronto: Women’s Press, 1993); Gayle MacDonald, Rachel L. Osborne & Charles C. 
Smith, eds., Feminism, Law, Inclusion: Intersectionality in Action (Toronto: Sumach Press, 2005); 
Judy Rebick, Ten Thousand Roses: The Making of a Feminist Revolution (Toronto: Penguin, 2005). 
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founded feminist legal organizations to advocate for women’s equality 
and to offer direct services to women clients. They championed concepts 
such as employment equity, demanding systemic changes within the 
legal profession and more broadly throughout society. Much of this must 
have seemed risky, even foolhardy, to many of the more senior women 
lawyers. More research needs to be done on the complex relationships 
between the two groups, but anecdotal evidence suggests some serious 
parting of the ways.11 Occasionally there was rapprochement, but 
typically only when discussions moved beyond matters of strategy into 
core assumptions about gender, because both groups believed that it was 
essential that women succeed in law. There was little disagreement about 
the fundamental objectives, but deeply-rooted dissension over how best 
to move forward toward those goals.  
In terms of chronology, Justice Wilson’s career marks her as one of 
the generation of early women lawyers. She entered law at a time when 
women represented fewer than five per cent of the profession.12 She 
enrolled at Dalhousie Law School in 1954, was called to the bar in 1958, 
and began work with the Osler’s law firm in Toronto in 1959.13 Yet her 
appointment as the first female judge of the Supreme Court of Canada 
was, in part, a response to the growing influence of feminism, and 
heralded by feminists within and outside of law as a cause for rejoicing.14 
Reflecting on this some years later, Justice Wilson stated:  
When I was appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada in the Spring of 
1982, a great many women from all across the country telephoned, 
cabled or wrote to me rejoicing in my appointment. “Now,” they said, 
“we are represented on Canada’s highest court. This is the beginning of 
a new era for women.” So why was I not rejoicing? Why did I not 
share the tremendous confidence of these women? First came the 
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 In 1980, Leah Cohen and I were compiling research on sexual harassment within the 
legal profession, and I interviewed a senior Vancouver lawyer, Mary Southin, to ask her views. She 
objected to the very topic, stating, “That’s like something out of a book,” and adding that lawyers 
were “fair and honourable professionally”. She could not believe that a male lawyer might twin his 
unwelcome advances with threats of reprisals. “It staggers the imagination,” was her response. I 
realize in retrospect that the resulting article, published in the Canadian Lawyer magazine (February 
1980) at 16-20, which juxtaposed her dismissive comments with details of egregious incidents of 
sexual abuse and humiliation, must have struck her as the height of folly. Informal conversations 
with Laura Legge, the first woman to become Treasurer of the Law Society of Upper Canada, 
indicate that of all the challenges she faced in her illustrious career, it was the behaviour of feminist 
lawyers that most upset her.  
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 See Survey of Higher Education and Universities, supra, note 8. 
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 For dates, see Judging Bertha Wilson, supra, note 1, chapters 3 and 4. 
14
 Id., at 125. 
38 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 41 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
realization that no one could live up to the expectations of my well-
wishers.15 
It was Justice Wilson’s fate to have reached the zenith of her career 
at a time when feminist voices had reached an unprecedented strength 
within law. Her tenure on the Supreme Court of Canada and her work as 
chair of the Canadian Bar Association (CBA) Task Force on Gender 
Equality in the Legal Profession, with its final report released in 1993, 
brought her squarely into the feminist legal movement and the flowering 
of second wave feminism. It was a complicated juxtaposition. 
III. BERTHA WILSON’S OWN EXPERIENCE OF GENDER IN LAW 
Even a cursory reading of Justice Wilson’s biography provides 
incontrovertible evidence that her legal career was greatly influenced by 
her gender. Justice Wilson experienced social exclusion as one of 
Dalhousie’s early women law students, none of whom were welcome in 
the university common room or the local fishermen’s tavern where the 
other students lingered. Dalhousie Law Dean Horace Read told Justice 
Wilson she should “just go home and take up crocheting”, and actively 
discouraged her from accepting a scholarship to do graduate legal 
studies at Harvard because there would “never be women academics 
teaching in law schools”.16  
It was difficult for women to find articles, and when she became the 
first female hired at Osler’s, she was warned that she could not stay 
permanently. She did stay, but Osler’s made her wait for nine years 
before bestowing partnership, in a milieu in which males were often 
given partnership in five. At first, she was not allowed to travel with 
male lawyers because of the potential for gossip. A woman who would 
have made a first-rate courtroom lawyer, she was not permitted to do 
litigation. Instead, she carved out a different path within the firm, as a 
“lawyer’s lawyer”, developing a separate legal research department (at 
the time an entirely new concept in Canadian legal culture), to conduct 
research on other lawyer’s files. Despite 16 years at the firm, she was 
never made senior partner or appointed to the senior management 
committee.17  
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 Bertha Wilson, “Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?” (1990) 28 Osgoode 
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 Judging Bertha Wilson, supra, note 1, at 38-49. 
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Her appointment to the courts sparked serious resistance from several 
judges and she found herself isolated from informal judicial discussions in 
ways that marginalized her influence. Fanatical anti-choice proponents 
deluged Justice Wilson with hostile letters during her constitutional rulings 
on abortion, with comments so hateful that her staff at the court were too 
frightened to open the mail. Anti-feminist responses to the CBA Task 
Force were virulent and directed at Justice Wilson personally, causing her 
great anxiety and concern.18  
Anderson mentions these difficulties, but stresses that Justice Wilson 
“did not nurture any feminist resentments”, and that she had “no desire 
to assert herself as equal in the sense of being identical with the more 
prominent male lawyers”. While at Osler’s, Justice Wilson tried to make 
her marginalization work positively for her, and seemed to relish her role 
as the creator of an innovative research department, viewing the 
minimum contact with clients and freedom from rainmaking 
responsibilities as a plus. Anderson also stresses that Justice Wilson was 
“prepared to accommodate ... and learn from” the male judges who 
spurned her.19 Reflecting upon her appointment as the first woman on the 
Ontario Court of Appeal in 1976, Justice Wilson was quoted as 
emphasizing the need to approach the male-dominant world of law with 
caution:  
I don’t believe that when I went on the court that the male judges took 
it for granted that I was going to be able to do the job. I think, maybe, 
that the view was contrary. So, to go on there and start throwing your 
weight around when you were, in their eyes, a novice … Well, you 
have to gain acceptance through your ability first and they will listen to 
you … A lot of women, I think, are of the view that as soon as you get 
into a group, you can start trying to change things. I don’t think it 
works. I think you have to go through this process of proving yourself 
first.20 
Throughout her investigations into the status of women in the 
profession as part of the CBA Task Force on Gender Equality, Justice 
Wilson maintained that she personally had encountered “only isolated 
instances of discrimination” perpetrated by a few individuals “during all 
her years in the legal profession”. She was apparently shocked and taken 
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 Id., at 94, 128, 150-64, 346-50. 
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 Id., at 57, 64, 94. 
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 Susan Lightstone, “Bertha Wilson: A Personal View of Women and the Law” (1998) 2 
(7) National 14. 
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aback at the widespread reporting of sexism that women lawyers and 
judges divulged to the Task Force. Her experience on the Task Force 
brought her smack up against the changes that the new cohort of feminist 
lawyers were effecting. They were no longer willing to discount and 
ignore sexist treatment, and they felt safe reporting their problems to 
Justice Wilson’s Task Force, because they perceived the female Supreme 
Court justice as sympathetic and supportive, even as a fellow feminist.21 
For Justice Wilson, “the whole experience became enormously painful”. 
In fact, Anderson suggests that it was not until after Justice Wilson 
released her Report, and felt the backlash that greeted the revelations 
therein, that she felt “her first unequivocal and deeply personal 
experience of gender discrimination”.22 
Despite the multiple manifestations of differential gender-based 
treatment that Justice Wilson experienced throughout her career, her 
biographer reports that Justice Wilson believed she had never been 
subjected to “persistent or systemic discrimination”.23 It is a conclusion 
that seems surprising, but it is a perspective that would have accorded 
with the public commentary of many of the women lawyers and judges 
of her generation. In the decades in which Justice Wilson launched her 
career, accommodation was the watchword. During her formative years 
in law, “nurturing feminist resentments” would have been unproductive, 
and asserting a position of formal equality quite likely doomed to failure. 
Instead, Justice Wilson, like others of her generation, cautiously adopted 
strategies of responding to male exclusion and hostility with politeness 
and persistence, and the pursuit of somewhat different career trajectory 
paths.  
It was a philosophy of life she brought forward into the 1970s, when 
the new cohort of feminist lawyers was demanding radical change. Their 
jubilance over Justice Wilson’s appointment to the Supreme Court 
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 Judging Bertha Wilson, supra, note 1, at 349-50. The Task Force Report suggests that 
women judges, who might have been reluctant to divulge information about sexist treatment 
publicly, felt confident in replying to the Task Force, knowing that Justice Wilson would be the only 
one to review their comments: Touchstones for Change: Equality, Diversity and Accountability, A 
Report on Gender Equality in the Legal Profession (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association, August 
1993), at 192-94 [hereinafter “Touchstones for Change”]. The contrast between their trust in Justice 
Wilson and their distrust of Chief Justice Lamer was well illustrated after the revelations of sexist 
mistreatment of female judges by their male colleagues became public. Chief Justice Lamer sought 
to identify the names of victims and culprits, and wrote to every federally appointed judge 
demanding details about unequal treatment. He received no replies. Judging Bertha Wilson, id., at 
349. 
22
 Judging Bertha Wilson, id. 
23
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apparently made her uneasy, as must have their wish to claim her as a 
fellow-traveller within the wider feminist movement. And some 
feminists were equally uneasy over Justice Wilson’s appointment, 
knowing that the “first” women into male-dominant preserves were 
generally chosen precisely for their accommodating philosophies. Some 
even worried privately that the first female Supreme Court justice might 
issue anti-feminist judgments, deflating any argument that an all-male 
bench needed the presence of women to give voice to real gender 
equality.24 
Furthermore, the feminist movement was never a monolithic or 
homogeneous phenomenon, as socialist feminists, radical feminists, 
liberal feminists and others struggled to define the goals and strategies of 
the new movement. It was sometimes difficult to know what “feminism” 
was, and many women expressed a sense of hesitation or uncertainty 
about identifying as feminist because they were not sure whether they 
qualified. As indicative of this, one woman with whom I was discussing 
this article quipped: “I wanted to ask: ‘Do you have to have a T-shirt and 
badge?’”25 When feminists began to engage in fractious debates over 
how to construct and delineate feminist principles, confusion reigned in 
many circles as women tried to decide whether they measured up to the 
movement’s demands.  
Still others understood “feminism” and “feminists” to be distinctly 
negative terms. In the eyes of many, feminism became the “F word”.26 
Women who wished to assert support for concepts such as equal pay and 
other doctrines of equality would commonly begin their discussions by 
saying “I’m not a feminist but …”. Justice Bertha Wilson’s biographer 
certainly would agree. She uses descriptions of feminism that emphasize 
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 I admit to harbouring some concerns on this point, as did others with whom I discussed 
the matter. Christine Boyle made a similar point in her article, “Sexual Assault and the Feminist 
Judge” (1985) 1 C.J.W.L. 93, at 94, in which she suggested that a feminist might have ethical 
objections to accepting an appointment to the bench, since as a judge she would be restricted to 
mere reformism, or would find herself “giving credibility to a morally bankrupt system”. On the 
tendency to select women with male perspectives for elevation to positions of power, see generally 
Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987) and 
Towards a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989). 
25
 I am indebted to Carolyn Bennett, M.P. for this wonderful quote. 
26
 One of the leaders of the post 1970s cohort, Ottawa lawyer Shirley Greenberg, noted that 
“feminists were reviled”. She did so on the occasion of receiving an award as an “exceptional 
woman” from the Hadassah-WIZO, adding: “I really feel that anything I do, or have done, is really 
because of my feminist convictions and my desire to advance the cause of women. Feminists have 
been reviled for decades, really, and it’s nice to see some are getting some positive recognition.” 
Jennifer Campbell, “Shirley Greenberg Receives Award for Efforts on Behalf of Women” Ottawa 
Citizen, October 24, 2007, at B3. 
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confrontational tactics and rigidity, and appears to have understood 
feminism as incorporating a pro-female, anti-male “bias”. To the extent 
that Bertha Wilson consciously or unconsciously accepted these 
characterizations, this might explain her rejection of the label. She may 
also have felt that if she publicly identified as a feminist, it would have 
attracted further dangerous backlash. She may have believed that 
claiming to be feminist was unwise, even impolite. Justice Bertha 
Wilson was not of the generation that marched in women-only “Take 
Back the Night” marches, or debated the transformative politics of 
radical lesbian separatism. The practices and strategies that were 
identified with the “feminist revolution” may have struck her as 
unfamiliar and out of character with her own world.  
IV. WRITTEN EVIDENCE OF BERTHA WILSON’S 
PERCEPTIONS OF FEMINISM 
Curiously, given her reluctance to identify as a feminist, the written 
record suggests that Justice Wilson did not fully adopt unfair stereotyped 
and pejorative understandings of feminism. To the contrary, she 
embraced a broad and inclusive definition. The best evidence of this is 
found in Touchstones for Change: Equality, Diversity and Accountability, 
the Report on Gender Equality in the Legal Profession, issued by the 
CBA Task Force that Justice Wilson chaired in 1993. Noting that gender 
discrimination was “more pronounced for female lawyers who bring a 
feminist perspective to their work”, her Report explained: 
There are many misconceptions about the nature of feminism which are 
used to impugn the credibility of those who give voice to a feminist 
perspective. It is essential to recognize that everyone operates under a 
value system which shapes what they see and how they interpret what 
they see. Feminism is only one of these perspectives. The following 
definition of “feminism” may help to dispel some of the misconceptions: 
A feminist is a person who believes women and men should 
be equal participants in society regardless of race, ethnic 
origin, economic background, gender, sexual orientation, or 
disability. A feminist believes women have not yet achieved 
equality in our society and that steps should be taken to 
correct this situation. Lastly, a feminist believes the world 
should be a comfortable place for women, men and children, 
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free of stereotypes and myths which restrict the roles each 
assumes.27 
This is a wide-ranging and inclusive definition of feminism, one that 
appears to run directly counter to most or all of the negative qualities 
described above. Indeed, it is hard to imagine that many people would 
have difficulty agreeing to sign on to this version of feminist politic.  
Justice Bertha Wilson’s Task Force Report also recognized the 
hostility that surrounded feminism, and expressed concern over the 
implications of this within the legal setting. It recounted a “disturbing 
level of anti-feminism” present in some law schools. Citing a survey at 
the University of New Brunswick, the Task Force noted that “about half 
of the women and a third of the men reported often hearing other 
students express derogatory or sexist comments about feminists”, and 
that “a substantial percentage of women had heard professors make 
derogatory or sexist comments about feminists”. In response, the Task 
Force recommended that law schools establish “on-going support 
programs to address the needs of students threatened by the poisoned 
environment”.28  
In addition, the Report documented concerns expressed by young 
female judges. Justice Wilson’s Task Force Report continued: 
Some of the younger women appointed were asked if they were 
feminists and told that feminists were unsuited for the judicial role 
because of their radical and biased views. Some were even told that 
feminism automatically disqualified them from sitting on cases 
involving sexual assault because of their anti-male prejudice! [The 
male members of the court] were simply applying their own 
preconceived ideas and exhibiting a mindset which clearly was not 
based on rational evidence but on myths and stereotypes accepted and 
applied without critical or constructive thought. 
. . . . . 
Those women judges were usually younger, recently appointed, and 
perceived by their male colleagues to be “radical feminists.” As has 
been pointed out by many writers on gender issues, a “radical feminist” 
in the eyes of some men may simply be a woman who believes in 
equality, publicly asserts that belief and attempts to achieve it. Because 
the existing norm has always been and still is the norm of inequality, 
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 Touchstones for Change, supra, note 21, at 11, quoting the Law Society of British 
Columbia, Gender Equality in the Justice System, vol. 1, at 1-3. 
28
 Id., at 33, 37. 
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equality must inevitably seem radical to some in that it is a total 
rejection of inequality. It does, indeed, go to the very “root” of it!29 
The Report left no doubt where it stood on this alleged bias matter: 
“There would appear to be no justification at all for denying women 
judges the opportunity to sit on sexual assault cases or any other case in 
which women have been victimized by men.”30 The Task Force 
recommended that “Chief Justices and Chief Judges treat women judges 
on their court fairly in the assignment or allocation of work.”31 
So we are left with the dilemma of a woman who defined feminism 
in terms that would seem to make it almost impossible for egalitarian-
minded individuals to disavow, who objected to the “anti-feminist” 
actions of those who defined feminism pejoratively, but who still would 
not self-identify as a feminist.  
V. CHARACTERISTICS OF A FEMINIST JUDGE  
Is it possible to claim that a woman judge who did not self-identify 
as a feminist did in fact utilize and adopt feminist principles? Perhaps 
the first issue to clarify here is how we would define feminist judging. 
Christine Boyle was one of the first scholars to attempt to explore this 
complex question. Recognizing that feminism is not monolithic, and that 
differences within feminist theory might result in different responses to 
gender-related questions, she nevertheless argued that a feminist judge 
would focus critical attention on the matter of gender. She suggested that 
a feminist judge would not use gender neutral analysis when considering 
gender specific issues, would attempt to take into account women’s as 
well as men’s interests, and would not allow male interests to 
“masquerade” as human interests.32 Michelle Boivin has argued that a 
feminist judge would seek to improve women’s lives while paying 
attention to the diversity of women’s experiences, and the wider 
contextual and surrounding circumstances.33 In a fascinating, as yet 
unpublished paper, Rosemary Hunter has begun to explore the many 
ways feminism might influence judges as they negotiate court processes, 
                                                                                                             
29
 Id., at 192-94. 
30
 Id.  
31
 Id., at 195. 
32
 Christine Boyle, “Sexual Assault and the Feminist Judge”, supra, note 24, at 101-104. 
33
 Michelle Boivin, “Les principes feminists en action: L’oeuvre judicaire de l’Honorable 
Juge Claire L’Heureux-Dubé or ‘Vior Juste, Voir Clair/e’” (2003) 15 C.J.W.L. 73, at 75-76. 
(2008), 41 S.C.L.R. (2d) THE POLITICS OF FEMINISM 45 
determine the outcome of cases, give reasons for their decisions, and 
engage in extra-curricular activities in areas such as law reform, public 
speaking and education, and mentoring of other women judges and 
lawyers.34 
Based upon these parameters, there is much in Bertha Wilson’s 
career that appears to be demonstrably feminist. To begin with 
fundamentals, within her domestic home life she and her husband John, 
a United Church minister, struck an egalitarian bargain in which 
household responsibilities were shared between the spouses. When 
Justice Wilson first commenced her legal studies and throughout her 
career, she did the housecleaning, while John handled the “grocery 
shopping and all of the cooking”. When she spoke to young female law 
students and lawyers, Justice Wilson urged them to strike similar 
arrangements with their own domestic partners, stressing that without 
equality at home, there was little prospect of career advancement. She 
was “brutally frank” in warning women against partners “who were not 
prepared to treat them with equal respect for their career aspirations and 
equal sharing of domestic responsibilities”. Break it off “sooner rather 
than later” was her strict admonishment.35 Equally impressive, a woman 
without children of her own, she was one of the chief architects of 
Osler’s first maternity leave policy, an innovation she championed on 
behalf of the women who followed her into the firm as associates and 
partners in the early 1970s.36 
Other scholars have provided much more expert analysis of Justice 
Wilson’s judicial opinions than I am able to do here, so I will only 
briefly flag several key Supreme Court of Canada decisions that seem to 
highlight feminist characteristics. Her 1979 Court of Appeal decision in 
Bhadauria v. Seneca College was a trail-blazing ruling that would have 
recognized a new common law tort of discrimination.37 Had it not been 
later overruled by the Supreme Court of Canada, the landscape of human 
rights law would have been completely transformed, with great potential 
for an expansion of equality principles based on gender, race, sexual 
orientation and disability. Her 1990 Supreme Court of Canada decision 
in Lavallee dramatically refashioned the Canadian law of self-defence 
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from its previously masculinist perspective, to take greater account of 
the gendered circumstances of battered women.38 Her 1988 Morgentaler 
decision struck down provisions in the Criminal Code39 that made it an 
offence to procure an abortion, in a ruling that emphasized the gendered 
distinctions involved in reproduction:  
It is probably impossible for a man to respond even imaginatively to 
such a dilemma not just because it is outside the realm of his personal 
experience (although this is, of course, the case) but because he can 
relate to it only by objectifying it, thereby eliminating the subjective 
elements of the female psyche which are at the heart of the dilemma.40  
Over time, the force of Justice Wilson’s personality was such that 
she was able to nudge some of the most influential judges on the 
Supreme Court of Canada to begin rethinking judicial perspectives on 
gender equality. Chief Justice Brian Dickson reportedly admired her 
efforts to reform common law to reflect changes in community values 
with respect to marriage and divorce in the Becker v. Pettkus case.41 And 
although his first impressions of the Lavallee case were opposite to those 
of Justice Wilson’s, she convinced him to transform his opinion. His 
biographers note that “Lavallee demonstrates Dickson’s growing 
attachment to Wilson’s equality views and his receptivity to her feminist 
perspective, which re-examined traditional legal doctrines in light of 
their effect on women.”42 Chief Justice Brian Dickson apparently once 
said that everything he knew about women’s rights, he learned from 
Justice Bertha Wilson.43  
Her extra-curricular activities off the bench offer additional evidence 
of risk-taking behaviour to publicly expose conduct that was sexist. In 
1989, Justice Wilson gave a lecture at the Canadian Institute for 
Advanced Legal Studies at Cambridge University in England, and 
participated in a panel discussion with U.S. Supreme Court judge Sandra 
Day O’Connor and Lord Ackner of the British House of Lords. During 
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the lunch that preceded the lecture, Justice Wilson apparently asked Lord 
Ackner why no woman had ever been appointed to the House of Lords. 
His unflaggingly direct reply: “No woman had ever been qualified.” 
When the topic of women on the bench was raised during the public 
lecture that followed, Justice Wilson repeated Lord Ackner’s response, 
causing him to explode in fury, and to claim that his remarks at lunch 
had been “privileged”. Interrupted in mid-sentence, Justice Wilson 
insisted that she be allowed to complete her retelling of Ackner’s 
comments, a courageous act that reportedly caused some ruffled feathers 
and shocked reaction.44 
Other public speeches reveal additional evidence of feminist 
perspectives. One of the most significant was the speech Justice Wilson 
gave at Osgoode Hall Law School in 1990, titled “Will Women Judges 
Really Make a Difference?”45 The public lecture came at a particularly 
fractious time at the school, as final settlement negotiations were still 
being worked out over the human rights complaint that more than 120 
women lawyers, law professors and law students had brought against 
Osgoode for its failure to appoint a feminist associate dean, Mary Jane 
Mossman, to the more powerful decanal position.46 In her remarks, 
Justice Wilson quoted research from sociologist Norma Wikler, that 
offered “overwhelming evidence that gender-based myths, biases, and 
stereotypes [were] deeply embedded in the attitudes of many male 
judges, as well as in the law itself”, and that “gender difference” was a 
“significant factor in judicial decision-making”.47 She noted that 
Canadian feminist scholars had advanced two propositions: “One, that 
women view the world and what goes on in it from a different 
perspective from men; and two, that women judges, by bringing that 
perspective to bear on the cases they hear, can play a major role in 
introducing judicial neutrality and impartiality into the justice system.”48  
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Justice Wilson noted that in some areas of the law, “a distinctively 
male perspective” was “clearly discernible” and that this had resulted in 
“legal principles that are not fundamentally sound”, adding: “Some 
aspects of the criminal law in particular cry out for change; they are 
based on presuppositions about the nature of women and women’s 
sexuality that, in this day and age, are little short of ludicrous.”49 Her 
concluding words were: “If women lawyers and women judges through 
their differing perspectives on life can bring a new humanity to bear on 
the decision-making process, perhaps they will make a difference. 
Perhaps they will succeed in infusing the law with an understanding of 
what it means to be fully human.”50 The press coverage of the speech 
described the event as “electrifying”.51 The furor prompted the anti-
feminist, conservative REAL women’s organization to launch a 
complaint against Justice Wilson, alleging that she was unfit to sit as a 
judge because of her feminist bias.52 
Shortly after her retirement, in 1991 Justice Wilson was appointed to 
chair the CBA Gender Equality Task Force. The resulting report was 
described by Justice Wilson’s biographer as being “as much of a 
bombshell” as the Women Judges and Difference speech one year 
earlier.53 Feminist analysis is laced throughout the 1993 Report. On the 
matter of curriculum development in legal education, the Report noted: 
“The principle of equality makes it clear that: a male perspective is not 
neutral; a white perspective is not neutral; a heterosexual perspective is 
not neutral; and so on”, adding: “[L]egal education must include a 
diversity of approaches to the law that reflect more than just one or two 
perspectives.”54 On the topic of judicial education, the Report noted that 
it was “regrettable that when Canada followed the United States’ lead in 
attempting to probe the degree of gender bias in its judiciary, the 
Canadian judiciary remained generally aloof from the process and did 
not provide the kind of leadership and support that many of the Chief 
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Justices in the United States provided.”55 In response, the Report 
endorsed “compulsory training for judges, in both gender and racial 
issues”.56  
In another example of risk-taking associated with this Report, Justice 
Wilson conducted a survey of the approximately 200 female judges in 
Canada, asking them whether they had ever personally experienced 
discrimination from their judicial colleagues. Recognizing the sensitivity 
of the question, Justice Wilson promised that she would be the only 
person to review the survey responses, that she would destroy the raw 
data as soon as these were summarized, and that she would protect the 
anonymity of all the participants. One hundred and thirty-two women 
responded. Fifty-eight reported having personally experienced discrimi-
nation on the bench. A number reported serious sexual harassment, 
identifying some offenders “well known for their proclivity in this 
direction”, and describing particularly egregious behaviour at judicial 
conferences where “alcohol is served”. All of this was duly documented 
in Justice Wilson’s final Report.57  
The Report’s release caused great controversy, upsetting Chief 
Justice Lamer and British Columbia’s Chief Justice McEachern, both of 
whom condemned Justice Wilson’s findings. Chief Justice Lamer 
insisted that Justice Wilson disclose which judges had complained, and 
who they had identified as culprits. He was so incensed that he 
personally wrote to every federally appointed judge to invite them to 
report to him any “bias or unequal treatment at the hands of judges”. Not 
surprisingly, there were no takers on this invitation. Chief Justice 
McEachern demanded that Justice Wilson disaggregate the statistical 
results, so that he could demonstrate that there were no problems in 
British Columbia. Some members of the CBA insisted that if Justice 
Wilson would not reveal her sources, all of her evidence of 
discrimination was suspect. Justice Wilson responded that she had given 
her word that the participants would not be identified, and resisted all 
demands. She stood by her evidence, her analysis and her conclusions.58  
In its assessment of substantive law, the Report articulated how 
central gender was to the development of legal rules and procedures: 
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The law as it has evolved over the centuries was made by men and for 
men. This recognition has sparked a great deal of interest among 
feminist lawyers and there is now a sizeable body of scholarship in 
both Canada and the United States on the extent to which an 
exclusively male perspective has conditioned the law and, in effect, 
suffused it with gender bias. Men have traditionally, and many still 
currently, view a male perspective as gender neutral. Yet one only has 
to think for a moment to appreciate that gender neutrality is a myth. [It 
is] very timely for the legal profession to review established legal 
principles from a female perspective, not because a female perspective 
is any more neutral than a male one, but because it is just possible that 
the combined perspectives might lead to a better, more relevant and 
more humane legal system.59 
Despite the reference to “humane” as the rationale of a just legal 
system, this goes far beyond a philosophy of humanism, clarifying that 
there is no such thing as gender neutrality. Justice Wilson’s Report 
insists that the male assumptions that underlie legal rules must be 
displaced, and that justice requires the full inclusion of female 
perspectives and experiences. This fits squarely within her wide-ranging 
and inclusive definition of feminism, and makes it difficult to argue that 
feminist principles are not deeply embedded in the Report’s findings and 
recommendations. Her work with the CBA Task Force on Gender 
Equality suggests that there were certainly times when Justice Wilson 
spoke as a feminist and for the feminist movement.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé recalls that she once confronted 
Justice Wilson with this query: “You say you’re not a feminist, but I 
think you’re the greatest feminist of all.” According to Justice 
L’Heureux-Dubé, her colleague was silent; Justice Bertha Wilson did 
not answer the implied question.60 The only comment I have been able to 
find that suggests that Justice Wilson was not as averse to the feminist 
label as we may suppose was published in a 1985 magazine article. 
Sandra Gwyn, a reporter for Saturday Night, wrote that Justice Wilson 
considered herself “a moderate feminist” while on the Court.61  
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Justice Wilson stood as a bridge between the former generations and 
the incoming cohort. Her character was formed in an era that erased 
gender and sought accommodation, and her subsequent career placed her 
squarely within the hotbed of feminist demands for revolutionary 
change. 
It would undoubtedly have been easier for the first female Supreme 
Court judge to avoid the controversy associated with her many gender-
focused judgments, the “Women Judges and Difference” lecture, and the 
CBA Task Force. Yet Justice Wilson’s career contains much that 
appears to be demonstrably influenced by feminism. She went further 
than many anticipated she might have, and became an icon for the young 
women lawyers who so desperately needed champions for equality in 
powerful places. Her uneasiness over the label “feminist” does not 
detract from the extraordinary influence she wielded with judicial 
decisions, public pronouncements, mentoring, and public policy reform 
that created marked inroads for women in law.  
Is it disrespectful to claim Justice Wilson as a “feminist judge” when 
she herself apparently refused to so identify? Some will undoubtedly 
think so. Others might argue that had more women in influential 
positions publicly taken up the title “feminist”, it would have served to 
minimize the vituperative hostility and unfair maligning of feminism, to 
further isolate those who dismissed feminism as “the F word”. For me, it 
is certainly reason for sadness that a towering figure such as Justice 
Wilson was so reluctant to self-identify. We must ask ourselves how 
misconceived must be the movement which has contributed so much to 
the advancement of equality, if women such as Justice Wilson sought to 
separate themselves from it. The female judge who wrote so distinctly as 
a woman when she proclaimed the constitutional right to abortion, who 
brought to Canadian law a distinctly gendered sensitivity to woman-
battering, who tried (and failed) to establish a new tort of discrimination, 
is someone who I would have hoped would have claimed the label of 
feminism with heart and soul.  
Still others might argue that it is equally disrespectful to those who 
took the label “feminist”, with all the backlash that provoked, to count 
Justice Wilson among their movement’s leaders. That said, Justice 
Wilson’s advancement of legal thinking about equality and 
discrimination constituted a life contribution that outstripped most of the 
jurists who had gone before. For litigants and litigators seeking access to 
a hitherto unreceptive, closed legal system, she opened vistas of 
opportunity, imagination and hope. In the end, I have come to the 
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conclusion that it would be a mark of the greatest respect to identify 
Justice Bertha Wilson as a feminist, both as a tribute to her legacy and as 
a tribute to the feminist movement itself. 
 
